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In this article, a condition for the optimal division’s number is calculated, for a market with two cable 
operators who offer a network service. The rationale for justifying the partial covering of the national 
market from the cable operators is presented. Furthermore, a problem of moral hazard is revealed, which is 
able to appear  through  the  implementation  of  franchising  schemes with  independent  divisions.  This  is 
particularly  interesting  because  it  can  be  applied  to  several  industries  such  as  Cable  Television  and 
Entertainment, and other activities including Internet and Computer Games Centres, which offer Internet 
broadband access and network games. 
 
 
Key Words: Cable Television, Divisionalization, Franchising. 
 
 




1  Introduction 
 
The industries, which operate the creation of, structuralized networks (as for example, the 
cable networks), and which use digital platforms of distribution, have come to assume an 
increasing importance in the development of the national economies.   
These bi-directional networks, that allow upload and download of information flows, need 
further investigations, that, on the one hand, explore the producer’ (or operator’) strategy in 
the determination of the optimal number of selling divisions, and, on the other hand, the 
choices  in  terms  of  the  type of  legal and business  relationship,  to  establish  between  the 
agents.   
The present article conciliates two research lines, namely, the study of the Economic of 
Networks (which includes the systems whose constitution is based on products or services 
that  present  a  complementary  and  interconectable  nature),  and  the  determination  of  the 
optimal dimension of the networks (that is, the number of selling divisions that guarantee the 
maximization of the operator profit).   
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The main innovation of the present analysis is the inclusion of the demand curve with 
realized expectations for network services, proposed by Economides and Himmelberg (1995) 
and  Economides  (1996),  into  the  analysis  of  the  optimal  dimension  of  the  networks. 
Moreover, the influence of the characteristics of the network services is explored, which may 
reveal  some  complementarities,  expressed  by  network  externalities  (in  production,  and 
consumption) that may influence the strategic decision concerned with the (total or partial) 
covering of a national market of consumers (or subscribers). 
Taking  into  consideration  the  installed  network,  the  operators  must  proceed  to  the 
optimisation  of  network  externalities  in  consumption,  that  are  expressed  by  the  service 
valuation attributed by the consumers, which increases with the number of consumers who 
subscribe this service.   
In the present analysis, one considers a national market with two operators, who offer 
network services, under the form of integrated packages, a re-evaluation of the incentives for 
the creation of selling divisions networks, is made. Later, the results of a game that considers 
the implementation of distinct royalties’ modalities are analysed.  
This analysis aims to extend the scope of application of literature about the creation of 
selling divisions networks, to present a condition for the determination of the optimal number 
of  selling  divisions  incorporating  the  demand  curve  with  realized  expectations,  and  to 
evaluate the impact of distinct royalties’ modalities on the profit earned by the operator.   
In  the  first  section,  a  model  for  the  determination  of  the  optimal  number  of  selling 
divisions  is presented, based  in  a  game  with  two phases,  in  which participate  two cable 
television operators. In the second section, a game expanded with three phases is developed, 
taking into consideration the possibility of celebrating franchising contracts.   
Finally, the main conclusions related with the development of the model are presented, 
and the reasons for regulating cable television industry are revealed.   
 
 
2  The Model 
 
In the works developed by Corchón (1991), Polaski (1992), Corchón e González-Maestre 
(2000),  Baye,  Crocker  e  Ju  (1996),  Yuan  (1999)  and  Bru,  Faulí-Oller  e  Haro  (2001)  is 
presented the problematic of the  incentives for the companies to create  selling divisions’ 
networks which interact in the market. Considering that Cournot competition scheme leads to 
a perfectly competitive result, the costs of creation of these networks tend for zero, given the 
dissipation of the oligopoly results.   
The strategic decision related with the creation of a selling divisions’ network has usually 
two effects on the total profit obtained by a firm, namely, an expansion of the firm’s market 
share and an increase of the competition between the existent selling divisions (Yuan, 1999).    
Taking into consideration the transaction of homogeneous products or services, the results 
obtained in the works cited above, establish that the creation of a new selling division has two 
main effects. First, it reduces the aggregate profit because of the increased competition and, 
second, it increases a firm’s share in the aggregate output and profit. If the goods or services 
offered by the firms are perfect substitutes, so the second effect always supplants the first. 
Nevertheless, the operators can delegate to the administrators of the selling divisions, the 
production  decisions, and  modify  its behaviour through the  implementation  of  incentives 
schemes, although they still maintain for itself investment decisions regarding capacities or 
new selling divisions (Veendorp, 1991 and González-Maestre, 2000).   
Instead of the Cournot scheme that is usually considered in the divisionalization literature, 
the companies can still enter in a competitive war (Huck, Konrade and Müller, 2001).     3 
The network owner can have a predatory behaviour to its direct competitors, as far as the 
effect of property of the network generates inter-temporal incomes (Farrel and Katz, 2001).   
In the literature concerning to the creation of selling divisions networks, the companies 
have  a  strategic  incentive  to  create  independent  franchisee  divisions,  assuming  that  this 
procedure leads to a more aggressive behaviour in order to increase the market share of the 
Mother Company (Warren-Boulton, 1974; O'Brien and Shaffer, 1992; Baye et al, 1996; Bru 
et al, 2001 and Dana and Spier, 2001). 
A monopolist who offers only highly differentiated products or services, may threat the 
entrant with the possibility of creating more selling divisions, in order to ensure the monopoly 
outcome. At monopoly, the credible threat of divisionalization in case of entry is enough for 
the incumbent firm to earn persistently and abnormally high profits in free-entry equilibrium, 
relative to the no-divisionalization case (Yuan, 1999).  
In  the  game  presented  at the  last  section  of  this article,  the  main economic fact that 
characterizes the franchising contracts is that, the incentives of the contractual parts do not 
always coincide (Klein, 1995).   
Taking as starting point the pioneering work of Baye et al (1996), a simple model of 
duopoly applied to a network market is presented, in which it is considered the co-existence 
of two upstream operators, who sell packages of cable television services, and for the purpose 
of distribution, use a downstream selling divisions network, or alternatively, an independent 
franchisee divisions network.  
We consider a two-stage divisionalization game with a duopoly supplying homogeneous 
services, with perfect information
1, where, firstly, it is determined the optimal  number of 
subscribers and, afterwards, is calculated the optimal number of selling divisions.  
To determine the optimal number of selling divisions, we consider the establishment of 
competing independent units, as being the process of creation of the selling divisions network 
(in the company internal environment), even so the model is also applicable equally to the 
cases where the franchising option is followed (in the company external environment)
2.   
For simplification, we consider two identical cable operators, which offer a homogeneous 
cable television service, and support a constant marginal cost (c).  In this formalization is 
assumed that the selling divisions of the operator support the same marginal cost, in the 
distribution of the television service.   
In this analysis, we consider the transactions of a network service, so the externalities 
generated by this kind of service allow to explore the possibility of offering complementary 
services, by each one of the operators, under the form of integrated packages, as far as the 
number of subscribers who subscribe the same cable television service increases (Economides 
and Himmelberg, 1995; Economides, 1996; Cabral, Salant, Woroch, 1997; Yang, 1997 and 
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2.1  Phase 1: Optimal Number of Subscribers 
 
 
In  phase  1,  all  the  selling  divisions  behave  a  la  Cournot,  as  independent  players,  in  a 
simultaneous game, and each operator takes the decision about the number of subscribers to 
reach,  but  considering  that  the  market  price  will  depend  on  the  number  of  subscribers 
obtained by both operators.   
For a certain cable operator, when we consider that the number of subscribers of the 
potential  base  (N
e)  is  equal  to  the  number  of  subscribers  of  the  installed  base  (N),  the 
following proposition is observed:   
 
Proposition 1:  Given the configuration in form of inverted U of the demand curve with 
realized expectations, the maximum profit of a cable operator is obtained in  3 / 2 = N . For 
1 3 / 2 < < N , decreasing prices are observed that do not assure the profit maximization of the 
cable operator.  
 
 
Proof:  See the appendix ￿ 
 
 
To proceed to the resolution of this game, we consider that competition is initiated in two 
phases.   Having nij, as being the amount of subscriptions obtained by the ith division of 
operator j, where: i = 1..., nj; and  j = 1, 2.  Additionally, N_ij is considered as being the total 
amount  of  subscriptions  obtained  by  all  the  selling  divisions,  except  the  number  of 
subscriptions reached by the ith selling division of operator j.   
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 = Total number of subscribers in the cable television market.   
 
We consider that the ith selling division of operator j chooses nij, in order to maximize its 
profit. This requires that, the condition of profit maximization be respected, given the equality 
between the marginal revenue (MR) and the marginal cost (MC).  This implies that, for any 
selling division (
*
ij n ) the optimal number of subscribers must satisfy the following condition:   
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e
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To simplify the model, we consider that all the selling divisions are identical, and then all 
must  choose,  in  equilibrium,  the  same  optimal  number  of  subscribers,  that  is, 
* * ; , ij n n j i = " .   
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Taking into consideration that the total number of selling divisions is  ( ) 2 1 h h + , so N_ij 
must be equal to:  ( )
*
2 1 1 n × - +h h . Substituting the conditions presented in the Eq. (2), the 
following one is obtained:   
 
Proposition 2:  The optimal number of subscribers for each operator is given by:   
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Proof:  See the appendix ￿ 
 
Taking  into  consideration  the  result  enunciated  in  Proposition  2,  the  total  number of 
subscribers in the cable television market (N), and the price (p), are obtained in the following 
way:   
 
Proposition 3:  The total number of subscribers (N) is given by the product between the total 
of selling divisions of the two cable operators, and the optimal number of subscribers, and is 
expressed by:   
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Proof:  See the appendix ￿ 
 
 
2.2  Phase 2: Optimal Number of Selling Divisions 
 
In phase 2, each one of the two operators chooses the number of selling divisions in order to 
operate in the downstream market, having,  2 1 h h and , as being the number of downstream 
selling divisions, chosen by operators 1 and 2, respectively. Additionally, a company incurs 
into a sunk cost K, in the creation of the local network (in the specific localization of the 
selling division) for the distribution of the cable television service. In this phase of the game, 
each selling division, when establishes a price (p), earns a profit ( ) ij p  given by:   
 








1 + + ×
-








n c n p           (6) 
 
Proof:  See the appendix ￿    6 
The two operators who anticipate the competition between selling divisions in phase 2, 
and that do not intend to cover the totality of the national market of cable television services
3, 
have to establish, in phase 1, the number of selling divisions,  2 1 h h and , that is going to 
implement.   
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Where:   1 i p  = Profit of ith selling division of operator 1, in phase 2.   
 
 
Reminding the Eq. (6), which expresses the profit earned by each  selling division of 
operator 1, in phase 2, the total profit of operator 1 can be rewritten as follows:  
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Therefore, operator 1, in order to maximize the profit, chooses the total number of selling 
divisions  (
*
1 h )  that  will  constitute  its  downstream  distribution  network,  considering  that 
operator  2  has  ( 2 h )  selling  divisions.    Therefore,  operator  1  chooses  the  best  response 
function (
*
1 h ), taking into consideration the number of divisions owned by the operator 2 
( 2 h ). By the calculation of the first-order condition( ) 0 / 1 1 = ¶ ¶ h p , we obtain the following 
expression:   
 
Proposition 6:  The best response function of operator 1 is given by:   
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In this game, when we consider that operator 2 is identical to operator 1, a symmetrical 
condition for 
*





2 h , it can be recognized that this 
symmetry implies that: 




2 h . Solving the Eq. (9), in order to
* h , the following one is 
obtained:   
 
Proposition 7:   The  optimal  number of  selling divisions  is  dependent  of the differential 
between the number of subscribers of the potential base and the marginal cost, as well as of 
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Proof: See the appendix ￿ 
 
 
3  Franchising Options 
 
The theoretical framework related with franchising was developed from the seminal work of 
Coase (1937), which originated distinct research lines, such as, the theory of agency (Ross, 
1973;  Arrow,  1985  and  Rees  1985a,  1985b),  and  the  theory  of  specific  assets  and 
opportunism (Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1978 and Williamson, 1985).   
Franchising can be considered as a form of economic relationship that is amongst the 
extremes of the hierarchies and the markets (Williamson, 1985).   
This relationship signals the principal that grants and the agent who receives the license or 
the concession for using a product, service, technology or trade mark.  
This organizational form is usually analysed in the existing literature from the theory of 
agency  perspective,  stressing  that  monitoring  costs  might  explain  the  use  of  franchising 
contracts to create a mechanism for an optimal coordination of the company activities, and 
the decentralization of the decision taking process. It also allows the creation of downstream 
distribution  networks,  which  guarantee  a  greater  dissemination  of  independent  selling 
divisions (Brickley and Dark, 1987; Norton, 1988; Brickley, Dark and Weisbach, 1991; and 
González-Maestre, 2000). 
 
To modelling this situation, after deducting the optimal number of selling divisions that 
guarantees the profit maximization for the cable operator, an extension of the game presented 
in section 2 is made, that equates the implementation of two distinct franchising options, 
which can be implemented by each one of the operators.   
To  extend  the  model  presented  in  section  2,  a  game  with  the  following  phases  is 
considered: 
 
·  Phase 1:  The operator chooses the optimal number of divisions, in franchising; 
 
·  Phase 2:  The operator selects the royalty modality; 
 
·  Phase 3:  The selling divisions (or the franchisees) take the decision about the number of 
subscribers to reach (according to the royalty modality selected by the operator).     8 
3.1  Optimal Number of Divisions in Franchising 
 
In phase 1, and taking into consideration the result founded in section 2.2. (Eq.  (10)), each 
operator chooses the number of selling divisions to operate in the downstream market.   
 
 
Lemma 1:  Considering that, operators 1 and 2 are identical (
*
1 h = 
*
2 h ), the optimal number  




































3.2  Royalties Modalities 
 
In phase 2, the operator can apply two alternative royalties’ modalities, to the franchisee.   
 
 
3.2.1  Modality 1 
 
In modality 1, we assume that the contract celebrated between the operator and the franchisee, 
establishes a price for the cable television service equal to a cost c, as well as a royalty 
payment, which corresponds to a fraction (a ) of the total revenue.   
Celebrating this kind of contract, the profit (
f
1 p ) 
4 will be equal to total revenue after-       
-royalty, less the corresponding cost, and is enunciated as follows:  
 
( ) ij ij
f n c n P × - × × - = a p 1 1   (11) 
 
 
Lemma 2:  For any positive royalty( ) 0 > a , the number of subscribers obtained through the 
application of modality 1, is smaller than the number of subscribers desired by the upstream 
operator.   
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3.2.2  Modality 2 
 
In modality 2, the contract between the operator and the franchisee establishes a price for the 
cable television service equal to a cost c, and the royalty payment corresponds to a fraction 
(a ) of the total profit obtained by the franchisee.   
Therefore, the profit of the franchisee (
f
2 p ) 
5 can be enunciated in the following way:   
 
( ) [ ] ij ij
f n c n P × - × × - = a p 1 2   (12) 
     
In an analogous way to modality 1, this payment system causes a reduction on the MR of 
the franchisee. However, such as it is easily observable in the Eq. (12), the modality now 
presented also provokes a reduction of the MC supported by the franchisee one.   
 
 
3.3  Optimal Number of Subscribers 
 
3.3.1  Modality 1 
 
In phase 3, applying the modality 1, and considering the equality between the net MR of the 
franchisee, and the MC supported by the operator, we can derive the optimal level of the 
franchisee subscribers, which is given by:   
 
( )












n   (13) 
 
 
Nevertheless, the operator can try to increase the profit level, through the application of a 
higher royalty.   
Observing the Eq. (13), we find out that this procedure would result in a decrease of the 
number of  subscribers,  that  is,  in  practice;  the  royalty  would be  charged  over  a  smaller 
volume of subscribers.   
Alternatively, the operator could establish one royalty equal to zero, however this option 
would result in selling the cable television service to the franchisee, at the marginal cost. This 
situation would cause an optimal joint profit, but the totality of this profit would be earned by 
the downstream franchisee.   
The imposition of a royalty different from zero is the only way for the operator to get a 
positive profit. However, any increase observed ina , would cause a reduction of the number 
of subscribers, which would not guarantees the  maximization of the two companies joint 
profit.   
Under the franchisee point of view, the imposition of a royalty over the total revenue is 
similar  to  the  application  of  a  rate  over  the  total  revenue.  Therefore,  this  provides  the 
reduction of its MR, as well as the reduction of the global incentives to reach new subscribers.   
As a result of this, the royalties’ scheme shows an imperfection revealed by the fact that 
franchisee reach a smaller number of subscribers, using a higher price. In this situation, we 
expect that, the franchisee is more interested in the profit maximization, in detriment of the 
maximization of the number of subscribers. 
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This situation describes the coordination problems originated by the implementation of 
this royalty modality, which may arise between the interests of the upstream companies, and 
the downstream ones. 
 
 
3.3.2  Modality 2 
 
In phase 3, applying the modality 2, and considering the equality between the MR and the 
MC, we can  derive  the  optimal  level of subscribers for  the  franchisee, expressed  by  the 
following:  
 










n n   (14) 
 
Lemma 3:  For any positive royalty( ) 0 > a , the number of subscribers obtained through the 
application  of  modality  2,  is  equal  to  the  optimal  number  of  subscribers  desired  by  an 
integrated company.   
 
 
Proof:  See the appendix ￿ 
 
 
3.4  Information Asymmetry 
 
The joint profit maximization is provided by the Eq. (12), which reveals the optimal level 
of subscribers that is obtained. However, this option, sometimes is not successful in the real 
world, because contrarily to the assumptions used in this analysis, the upstream operator can 
have an insufficient level of information about the net profit obtained by the franchisee, due 
to lack of information concerning the formation of the costs supported by the franchisee.   
The existence of this information asymmetry means that, the upstream operator faces a 
problem of moral hazard in the achievement of its commercial relations with the downstream 
franchisee.  
For example, considering that a franchisee supports a fixed cost (F), in the development 
of its activity,  known by the franchisee, but not by the operator. For such, the net profit 
obtained by the franchisee (
f
' 2 p ) 
6 would be equal to:   
 
( ) [ ] F n c n p ij ij
f - × - × × - = a p 1 ' 2   (15) 
 
In this  situation, the franchisee  can communicate a higher value of F, or transmit an 
inflated value of the total costs, in order to appropriate the totality of the profit.   
In short, the  liquidation of royalties based on the total profit (or, simply on the total 
revenue)  does  not  provide  a  satisfactory  result  for  the  upstream  operators,  since 
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4  Conclusions 
 
 
The main contribution of the model is revealed in Eq. (10), which shows that the bigger 
the difference between the number of subscribers of the potential base (N
e) and the marginal 
cost (c), and the smaller the sunk cost of the cable network installation (K), the bigger will be 
the number of selling divisions chosen by the two operators, in phase 1 of the game. The 
denominator of the Eq. (10) is also affected by N
e, and then if N
eK increased, the number of 
selling divisions chosen by the operators would decrease.  
The operators’ decision about the decreasing of the number of selling divisions, on the 
one hand, aims to prevent the total profit dissipation and, on the other hand, reveals the 
unilateral incentive to restrict their divisions from further dividing.  
This result diverges from the conclusions of Baye et al (1996), where is argued that a 
higher price-cost differential, will generate incentives for the creation of selling divisions, 
and, for such reason, the optimal number of selling divisions (
* h ) will be higher.   
It must be stressed that the present analysis incorporates the demand curve with realized 
expectations for a network service, in form of inverted U, having this procedure as main 
implication the determination of a new
* h , that guarantees the maximization of the operators 
profit, using selling division networks that guarantee a partial market covering, and taking 
into consideration the sunk cost supported in the creation of the cable network.  
The determination of 
* h  allows the two operators (duopolists, in the national market) not 
to come close to the competitive balance.   
This analysis can help to explain the reason for the existence of a partial covering of the 
national territory, in terms of the cable television service.   
The  situation  described  above suggests  that  the  vertical  relations  established with  the 
creation of an integrated selling divisions network, or alternatively, a franchisees network can 
be harmful to total welfare.   
This type of strategic conduct by the operators and the franchisees needs special attention 
from  regulatory  agencies.  The  cable  television  industry  presents,  furthermore,  a  complex 
technical composition that must be regulated, in a competitive sense, since it congregates the 
broadcasting and the circuits’ areas, which make possible the access to integrated packages 
tie-in  sales  of  different  services  (Basic,  Premium,  Internet,  Fixed  Telephone,  Interactive 
Television, Data Transmission, etc).   
The  regulatory  agencies should  also  take into consideration  the  effect  of  this  type of 
vertical relations on the total welfare, as well as on defining the relevant markets, inquiring 
the  conditions  of  entry,  and  controlling  the  existence  of  dominant  positions,  in  order  to 
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6  Appendix 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: 
 
Taking into consideration the inverse demand curve with realized expectations, we find that: 
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Proof of Proposition 2:  
 
Considering that:  ( ) N N p
e - = 1  
 
Having:   ij ij n N N + = _  
 
ij ij ij ij an N n N = Û - + = _ 2 1 _ ) 1 ( h h  
   
 
The total profit is given by:   
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From the maximization profit condition, we derive the following:   
 







e e n N c an N N c n N N N N MC MR 2 2 _  
 
) 1 ( ) 2 (
) 2 (


















n n a N N c N  ￿ 
   15 
Proof of Proposition 4:  
 
The price of the service offered by each cable operator is given by: 
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Proof of Proposition 5:  
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Proof of Proposition 6:  
 
The total profit function of operator 1 is given by:   
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Proof of Proposition 7:  
 
 
Taking into consideration the result enunciated by the Proposition 6, that is:   
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Proof of Lemma 2:  
 
 
With modality 1 (that is, payment of a royalty over the total revenue), the franchisee profit is 
the following:   
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From  the  maximization  profit  condition  (MR  =  MC),  we  obtain  the  optimal  level  of 
subscribers with the application of modality 1:   
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Proof of Lemma 3:  
 
 
Under the modality 2 (that is, payment of a royalty over the total profit), the franchisee profit 
is the following:   
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From  the  maximization  profit  condition  (MR  =  MC),  we  obtain  the  optimal  level  of 
subscribers with the application of modality 2:   
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